1. IP addresses are NOT logged in this forum so there's no point asking. Members are encouraged to install GOM or HOLA or TUNNELBEAR for an added layer of protection.

    The SEX forum is HERE so please stop asking.

Chitchat What happened in Saudi Arabia in the last 3 days ?

Discussion in 'The Courtyard Café' started by scroobal, Nov 6, 2017.

  1. Leongsam

    Leongsam Administrator Staff Member Old Timer Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jul 10, 2008
    Messages:
    36,919
    Likes Received:
    245
    Trophy Points:
    63
    The Middle East is deeply Tribal. It is inevitable that Tribal warfare is rampant and will continue to be so for a long time to come.

    Democracy is impossible to implement at the moment. We might have to wait a few hundred years before it becomes remotely feasible.
     
  2. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
  3. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 5.30.40 PM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 5.28.20 PM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 5.28.47 PM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 5.29.01 PM.png

    MBS did not clinch it in the end:

    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 11.17.52 PM.png
     
    Last edited: Dec 6, 2017
  4. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
  5. scroobal

    scroobal Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jul 16, 2008
    Messages:
    24,949
    Likes Received:
    194
    Trophy Points:
    63
    I have been reading up lately and going deeper into their history and I have come to same conclusion. The concept of country, region etc makes no sense to them. Its the tribe and the family book showing their tribal lineage that is singularly important.

    I also understand in nearly all matters with the Government the locals have to produce their family book.

    What is also interesting is the sense that their locals including the educated ones have no desire to move towards democracy. Their do desire representation of men and women in municipal and cabinet matters but the absolute monarchy to remain.

    The difference is that the monarchy has to continue to provide for his people or he loses his throne to the next in line. None of the western concepts seem to apply.

    There is also the existence of "bidoon" some of whom who have not registered for a family book yonks ago or whose origins are questionable and have become stateless.

     
  6. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
    Again this only really applies to the Gulf States - not the other Arab states - the entrenched desert falcon imagery is tied to them - the national dress of the thoub distinguishes one Gulf State from another but the gutra signifies their tribal affiliations i.e. some tribes will wear the red-white combo whilst others only wear the white (depending on which Gulf state). So conceptually your observation is only really applies to the Gulf States (in particular with the family book). During the winter months they switch the white thoub for colourful ones. There is another level of social norm that applies then.

    The kind of tribalism in Yemen is very different and even the Gulfis dont subscribe to their norms.

    The other tribal affiliations in places like Lebanon and Syria operate on significantly different norms - cross over to North Africa and it is again very different.

    Just like other colonial constructs, each one of these states came into being after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and created by the Great Powers. This is not a unique proposition but these are not necessarily displaced folk who migrated from one country in a completely different geographical area to another. So they are very much attached to their cultural norms without any additional influences. It is not a rojak culture like in Singapore or Malaysia which is probably why it is so difficult for people in this part of the world to grasp the nuances. Quite admirably the family book is updated and accurate so they can trace their lineage back hundreds of years. Not many immigrants in Asia can do that because it was simply not part of the culture or practice.

    The Bidoon issue persists in all the Gulf states as they are effectively "stateless".

    In viewing this part of the world, one size simply cannot fit all and labelling it a generic "Arab" issue is ill-informed and naive.
     
    Last edited: Dec 6, 2017
  7. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 11.30.54 PM.png Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 11.31.05 PM.png


    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 11.49.35 PM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 11.47.49 PM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 11.48.01 PM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 11.48.09 PM.png

    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 11.55.08 PM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 11.55.17 PM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-06 at 11.55.26 PM.png
     
    Last edited: Dec 6, 2017
  8. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
  9. scroobal

    scroobal Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jul 16, 2008
    Messages:
    24,949
    Likes Received:
    194
    Trophy Points:
    63
    Point taken.

     
  10. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
    Take for example the Saudis. The supposed ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ is led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, a thirty-something hothead who in his heart of hearts would rather have his fantasy Silicon-Valley-in-the-desert than another mosque, especially one in which he hasn’t ever stepped foot.

    The Gulf Arab world seems chock full of “modern pro-Western moderates” like MbS. Raised on Xboxes, fed a steady diet of filtered information from sycophantic advisors (or in this case, McKinsey consultants) and illiterate to the Islamic history they’re purported to represent. One can easily imagine MbS sitting criss-cross-applesauce in one of the palace’s private majlis rooms, rubbing his prayer beads and nodding in agreement as Jared Kushner sells him late into the early morning hours a bill of goods about the wonders of the “ultimate” deal between Israelis and Palestinians; how the Saudi-American-Israeli-Emirati bloc could follow that to the main course Iran; and how the end result will be Team Trump securing the MbS dynasty for many years to come. And everyone gets fantastically rich along the way!

    In short, the Saudis and Emiratis have validated all the pro-Israeli think-tank commentary over the years suggesting that “moderate Arab” states are obsessed with Iran and could care less about the Palestinian cause, at least in private.


    Screen Shot 2017-12-07 at 8.27.56 AM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-07 at 8.28.06 AM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-07 at 8.28.17 AM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-07 at 8.28.27 AM.png
     
  11. scroobal

    scroobal Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jul 16, 2008
    Messages:
    24,949
    Likes Received:
    194
    Trophy Points:
    63
    Swisher’s article is poor. He seems to think 2 dimensionally and assume that every approach has to be binary.

    Iran has been a consistent and growing threat and clearly destabilising the region. They no longer can ignore and with Trump insular mind there is no one else but themselves (Arabs).

    Arabs politics does not lend itself easily to the use of the media as a ready messenger or medium on policy, strategy and tactics and is a known cultural trait.

    So do the Arab Sunnis drop every thing to address Trump’s Jerusalem adventure.

    Palestine is not just an Arab Sunni issue. Much of the World have adopted their cause. The physical move is in years. Iran however is an immediate issue for them and they remain second best to the Iranians. It can be argued that Iran Is in a much more better position in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Yemen in comparison with the House of Saud than 15 years ago. And also in comparison with the US and the Western World.


    Palestine is one of optics and a long term strategy. The game is still on. Focus on the optics at one’s peril.

     
  12. Kotekbengkok

    Kotekbengkok Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    May 3, 2017
    Messages:
    97
    Likes Received:
    5
    Trophy Points:
    8
    Perhaps I am partial, but Iran is not quite the the growing threat and destabilizing threat as it is made out to me. Having been to Iran a few times and still have friends there who keep in touch, many there will tell me that Iran has to act they way they do because of the belligerence of the Arabs and the American policy to Iran post 1979. They have no issues with the Europeans but they have not much choice in the matter with the Americans calling the shots. However Europeans have lost patience and back in Iran, investing.The Iranians genuinely believe that they are the only ones who really have the where-with-all to keep Israel and the Americans in check. They may not be far wrong considering how the Saudi American relations. The Saudis bombed New York 911 and today they are the best of pals. The following article written in 2015 still relevant:

    http://lobelog.com/no-iran-isnt-destabilizing-the-middle-east/

    No, Iran Isn’t Destabilizing the Middle East
    June 8, 2015Guest 1 Comment
    [​IMG]

    by Paul R. Pillar

    As the nuclear negotiations with Iran enter what may be their final lap, diehard opponents of any agreement with Tehran have been leaning more heavily than ever on the theme that Iran is a nasty actor in the Middle East intent on doing all manner of nefarious things in the region. Insofar as the theme is not just an effort to generate distaste for having any dealings with the Iranian regime and purports to have a connection with the nuclear agreement, the idea is that the sanctions relief that will be part of the agreement will give Iran more resources to do still more nefarious stuff in the region. Several considerations invalidate this notion, just on the face of it, as a reason to oppose the nuclear agreement. The chief one is that if Iran really were intent on doing awful, destructive things in its neighborhood, that would be all the more reason to ensure it does not build a nuclear weapon—which is what the agreement being negotiated is all about.

    Another consideration is that if the United States were to leave in place economic sanctions that supposedly were erected for reasons related to Iran’s nuclear program, and to leave them in place to deny Iran resources to do other things, the United States would be telling not only Iran but also the rest of the world that the United States is a liar. The United States would have lied when it said that it had imposed these sanctions for the purpose of inducing concessions regarding Iran’s nuclear policy. The damage to U.S. credibility whenever the United States attempts in the future to use sanctions to induce policy change should be obvious.

    Interestingly, calls to keep current sanctions in place to deny funding for Iranian regional activities are coming from some of the same quarters that call for putting even more of an economic squeeze on Iran to get a “better deal”. This position is contradictory. If the United States were to demonstrate that it is not going to remove existing sanctions in return for Iran’s concessions on its nuclear program, the Iranians would have no reason to believe that still more concessions on their part would bring the removal of still more sanctions—and thus they would not make any more concessions.

    An invalid assumption underlying the argument about freeing up resources is that the Iranians’ regional policy is narrowly determined by how many rials they have in their bank account. This assumption contradicts, by the way, the assertion commonly made, again by some of the same quarters, that Iranian leaders are far from being green eyeshade types who do such careful calculations and instead are irrational religious fanatics who cannot be trusted with advanced technology let alone with a nuclear weapon. In any case, with Iran just as with other states, foreign policy is a function of many calculations of what is or is not in their national interest, and not just a matter of the available financial resources.

    A related unwarranted assumption is each additional rial that does become available to the Iranians they will spend on regional shenanigans that we won’t like. That assumption is never supported by any analysis; it just gets tossed into discussion to be taken for granted. If analysis is instead applied to the topic, a much different conclusion is reached; that Iran is far more likely to apply freed resources to domestic needs. This is a straightforward matter of political calculations and political survival, not only for President Rouhani but for other Iranian leaders who are acutely aware of the demands and expectations of the Iranian people in this regard.

    But set aside for the moment all the logical inconsistencies and other reasons to reject the notion of an Iranian regional marauder as a reason to oppose the nuclear agreement. Focus instead on the image of an Iran whose current regional policy supposedly is already an assortment of destructive activities. This image has become the kind of conventional wisdom that repeatedly gets invoked (even, in this instance, by supporters of the nuclear agreement) without any felt need by those who invoke it to provide any supporting facts or analysis because it is taken for granted that everyone “knows” it to be true. The references to the image are almost always vague and general, couched in terms of Iran supposedly “destabilizing” the Middle East or seeking to “dominate” it or exercise “hegemony” over it, or that it is “on the march” to take over the region. Often there are references to “terrorism” and “subversion” without anything more specific being offered. Often the names of conflict-ridden countries in the region are recited, but again without any specifics as to who is doing what in those countries.

    To get away from such uselessly general accusations, ask: (1) what exactly is Iran doing in the Middle East that is of concern; and (2) how does what Iran is doing differ from what other states are doing in the same places? A careful comparison of this sort leads to the conclusion that Iran, contrary to the conventional wisdom, does not stand out in doing aggressive, destabilizing, or hegemonic things.

    Iran is one of the largest states in the Middle East and naturally, as with any such state, competes for influence in its region. To try to keep any such state, be it Iran or any other, from competing for such influence would be futile and damaging in its own right. To label Iranian policy as seeking “hegemony” or “domination” is only that—i.e., applying a label—when others are using more forceful and destructive ways of trying to extend their own influence in the same places. Iran, unlike others, has not launched wars or invaded neighboring territory (except in counterattacking during the war with Iraq that Saddam Hussein started). Nor has Iran drawn, China-like, any nine-dash lines and asserted unsupported domination over swaths of its own region.

    The assumption that just about anything Iran does in the Middle East is contrary to U.S. interests keeps getting made despite what should be the glaringly obvious counterexample of the war in Iraq. Iran and the United States are on the same side there. They both are supporting the government of Iraq in trying to push back the radical group generally known as ISIS. Why should Iran’s part of this effort be called part of regional trouble-making, while the U.S. part of it is given some more benign description? Those in the United States who would rather not face that counterexample are usually quick to mutter something like, “Yes, but the Iranians are doing this for their own malign purposes of spreading their influence in Iraq.” The first thing to note in response to such muttering is that if we are worried about increased Iranian influence in Iraq, that increase is due chiefly not to anything the Iranians have done but rather to a war of choice that the United States initiated.

    The next thing is to ask on behalf of what interests the Iranians would use their influence in Iraq, and how that relates to U.S. interests. The preeminent Iranian objective regarding Iraq is to avoid anything resembling the incredibly costly Iran-Iraq War, and to have a regime in Baghdad—preferably friendly to Iran, but at least not hostile to it—that would not launch such a conflict again. Iran also does not want endless instability along its long western border, and its leaders are smart enough to realize that narrowly prejudicial sectarian politics are not a prescription for stability. These lines of thinking are consistent with U.S. interests; it is not only in the current fight against ISIS that U.S. and Iranian interests converge.

    Look carefully also at another conflict-ridden Middle Eastern state whose name often gets casually invoked: Yemen. Iran and the United States are not on the same side of this civil war, although the United States probably has as much explaining to do as to why it has taken the side it has—the same side as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the most capable and threatening Al-Qaeda branch operating today—as Iran does. Iran has become identified with the side of the rebellious Houthi movement, although the most prominent Yemeni leader on the same side as the Houthis is Ali Abdullah Saleh, who as the Yemeni president for more than thirty years was seen as our guy in Yemen, not the Iranians’ guy.

    Iran did not instigate the Houthi rebellion, nor are the Houthis accurately described as “clients” of Iran much less “proxies,” as they often inaccurately are. Instead Iran was probably a source of restraint in advising the Houthis not to capture the capital of Sanaa, although the Houthis went ahead and did it anyway. The Iranians probably are glad to see the Saudis bleed some in Yemen, and whatever aid Tehran has given to the Houthis was given with that in mind. But any such aid pales in comparison to the extent and destructiveness of the Saudis’ intervention in Yemen, which has included aerial assaults that have caused many hundreds of civilian casualties.

    In the same vein consider Bahrain, which is an interesting case given historical Iranian claims to Bahrain and past Iranian activity there. Despite that background and despite Bahraini government accusations, there is an absence of reliable evidence of anything in recent years that could accurately be described as Iranian subversion in Bahrain. Instead it is again the Saudis who have used forceful methods to exert their influence on a neighbor, and in this case to prop up an unpopular Sunni regime in a Shia majority country. The principal Saudi military intervention in Bahrain came a few years ago, but it was an early shot in a campaign that has taken fuller shape under King Salman to use any available means, including military force, to expand Saudi influence in the region. If there is a Persian Gulf power that has been using damaging methods to try to become a regional hegemon, it is Saudi Arabia, not Iran.

    The Saudis could claim to be acting on behalf of a status quo in Bahrain and Yemen, but then what about Syria, where it is Iran that is backing the existing regime? And as perhaps the most germane question, how can any one of the outside players that have mucked into that incredibly complicated civil war be singled out as a destabilizing regional marauder while the others (some of whom, such as the United States and Israel, have conducted their own airstrikes in the country) be given the benefit of more benign labeling? Iran did not start the Syrian war. And each of the most significant sides fighting that war are dominated by what we normally would consider certifiable bad guys: the Assad regime, ISIS, and an Islamist coalition led by the local Al-Qaeda branch. It is hard to see a clear and convincing basis for parceling out benign and malign labeling here when it comes to the outside players.

    Then of course there is the rest of the Levantine part of the region, including Palestine; the aid relationships that Iran has had with the H groups—Hezbollah and Hamas—are continually invoked in any litany of Iranian regional activity. Lebanese Hezbollah certainly is still an important ally of Iran, although it has long since become strong enough to outgrow any Iranian hand-holding. We should never forget that prior to 9/11 Hezbollah was the group that had more U.S. blood on its hands through terrorism than any other group. We also should understand that Hezbollah has become a major player in Lebanese politics in a way in which many in the region, including its immediate political opponents, accept it as a legitimate political actor. Right now as a military actor it is deeply involved in the effort to support the Syrian regime, and it is not looking to stir up any new wars or instability anywhere else.

    Hamas has never been anything remotely resembling a proxy of Iran, although it has accepted, somewhat reluctantly, Iranian aid in the absence of other help. To Iran, Hamas represents Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation of (or blockading and subjugation of) Palestinian territory, without being an accessory to that occupation, which is how the Palestinian Authority is widely seen. Hamas is the winner of the last free Palestinian election, and it has repeatedly made clear that its ambition is to hold political power among Palestinians and that it is willing to maintain a long-term truce with Israel. Right now Hamas is trying, unfortunately with only partial success, to keep small groups from overturning the current cease-fire with rocket firings into Israel. Again, none of this is a conflict that Iran has instigated or that Iran is stirring up or escalating. Iran is not the cause of the instability that already reigns. And the broader opposition to continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory is opposition that Iran shares with many others, including the whole Arab world.

    As long as we are looking at this part of the region, it is impossible to escape notice that Iran does not hold a candle to Israel when it comes to forcefully throwing weight around in the neighborhood in damaging and destabilizing ways, even without considering the occupation of the West Bank. This has included multiple armed invasions of neighboring territory as well as other actions, such as the attack on Iraq years ago that stimulated Iraq to speed up its program to develop nuclear weapons.

    And before we leave the Middle East as a whole, it also is impossible to escape notice that the single most destabilizing action in the region over the past couple of decades was the U.S. launch of a war of aggression in Iraq in 2003. Iran certainly has done nothing like that.

    The ritualistically repeated notion that Iran is wreaking instability all over the region is a badly mistaken myth. There are important respects in which Iranian policies and actions do offend U.S. interests, but protection of those interests is not helped by perpetuating myths.

    Perpetuation of this particular myth has several deleterious effects. The most immediate and obvious one is to corrupt debate over the nuclear deal. Another is to foster broader misunderstanding about Iranian behavior and intentions that threatens to corrupt debate over other issues as well.

    Yet another consequence involves a failure to understand fully that every state competes for influence. Such efforts to compete are called foreign policy. It would be in our own interests for other states to wage that competition through peaceful and legitimate means. By misrepresenting who is doing what, and through what means, in the Middle East today, the myth about Iranian behavior maintains a constituency for isolating and ostracizing Iran—which makes it less, not more, likely that Iran, so ostracized, will use peaceful and legitimate means to pursue its interests in the future.

    This article was first published by the National Interest and was reprinted here with permission. Copyright The National Interest.




     
  13. istana_pest

    istana_pest Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Sep 12, 2008
    Messages:
    85
    Likes Received:
    4
    Trophy Points:
    8
    Saudi royal detainees mostly willing to hand over their wealth to bail out their own ass from Golden Escalator's chains.

    http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2017-12/07/c_129758777.htm



    沙特反腐一个月 嫌疑人大多愿花钱“和解”
    2017-12-07 06:45:08 来源: 新华网

    关注新华网
    微信
    微博
    Qzone

    0
    评论

      沙特阿拉伯掀起反腐风暴一个月后,检察官宣布重大进展:目前仍被关押的159人中,大多数人已经同意与检方达成和解,即交出非法所得,换取获释。

      【花钱买平安】

      总检察长沙特·穆吉卜5日在一份声明中说,自反腐风暴掀起后,迄今共计传讯320人,冻结376个银行账户。现阶段,159人被关押在首都利雅得的丽斯卡尔顿酒店。

      穆吉卜说,大多数嫌疑人已经同意与检方达成“和解”,承诺将非法所得上交国库。“必要的协议正在收尾,以完成这类和解。”

      沙特国王萨勒曼上月4日下令成立由王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼为主席的最高反腐委员会。当晚便有11名王子、38名现任和前任大臣及众多富商被捕。

      嫌疑人包括前国王阿卜杜拉的儿子、国民卫队司令米特阿卜,号称“中东巴菲特”的沙特首富阿勒瓦利德王子,现任经济和计划大臣阿蒂勒、前利雅得省省长图尔基、前财政大臣阿萨夫,以及前皇家典礼局局长、前沙特航空公司总裁、前沙特电信公司总裁、前投资总署署长等沙特军政商界重量级人物。

      穆吉卜先前说,这些嫌疑人过去数十年间侵吞公款、贪腐,涉案金额大约1000亿美元。

      【赃款交国库】

      上月底,穆罕默德王储接受美国《纽约时报》采访时说,大约95%的在押嫌疑人同意和解,要么上交现金,要么同意政府“分成”其买卖收益。

      同在上月底,王子米特阿卜与政府达成“和解协议”后获释。有媒体报道,他支付超过10亿美元“和解金”。

      上周,一名沙特政府大臣向路透社记者证实,本轮反腐行动的大多数嫌疑人已经被捕,政府准备将500亿至1000亿美元的追回赃款注入经济发展项目。

      【不和解续拘押】

      穆吉卜5日在声明中说,最高反腐委员会将分两阶段处理反腐风暴中被抓的涉贪王子、高官和富商。

      第一阶段是向被抓贪腐嫌疑人出示犯罪证据,然后与其谈判,要求其交出非法所得达成和解,最后将其释放。和解阶段将于数周后结束。

      谈判过程中,嫌疑人获准联系任何人,也可以拒绝和解协议。签署了和解方案的人可获特赦,针对其的刑事诉讼也将结束。

      第二阶段是针对不同意和解的嫌疑人。他们将被起诉,被继续关押半年,甚至更久。

      美联社报道,图尔基王子、阿勒瓦利德王子等人依然在押。(杜鹃 王波)(新华社专特稿)

    [​IMG]





    重量级王子获释,沙特反腐收尾?

    沙特外长:反腐风暴两年多前就开始酝酿了

    沙特对内忙反腐 对外多线出击
     
  14. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
    Screen Shot 2017-12-07 at 8.30.53 PM.png
    Screen Shot 2017-12-07 at 8.31.02 PM.png

    Contrast with the statement:

    Screen Shot 2017-12-07 at 8.32.57 PM.png
     
  15. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
    There is clearly exasperation in Swisher's article but I don't think the "binary" aspect stems from lack of understanding of the complexities of the situation. The region has never been stable post collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Each of the Great Powers in their colonial zeal sought to exert themselves and establish influence. WW2 dismantled many colonial outposts but the significance of oil just perpetuated the misery inflicted on the region, by outsiders meddling and their own social dynamics.

    Don't neglect that Iran held democratic elections in 1953 only for the CIA and Brits to meddle and put the Shah in place by staging a coup. So much for supporting democracy. So do you believe after that, a people with a rich and storied culture 2000 years old would simply allow themselves to be made subservient once again to the whims of the West? They are non-Arabs in a tough neighbourhood. One year after the revolution they were attacked by Iraq in a long drawn out and pointless war. The Americans armed Saddam then. This is not forgotten either. Then there was a lull in the 90s when Saddam decided to turn against Kuwait and post-9/11 the same folks that supported him invaded under false pretences and destroyed that country, unleashing sectarianism. And opportunity.

    With the Arab Spring, undemocratically elected royalty decided they wanted get rid of Assad - and they set about arming the same brutal militias of extremist zealots with money and arms. A social uprising turned into an all out civil war. This had led to yet another great cradle of ancient civilisation completely decimated. Yet who are the people that have suffered and forced into becoming refugees? Have you seen the numbers of what Muslim denomination the Syrian refugees are? Assad belongs to a minority Shia offshoot yet his army and generals are predominantly Sunni as are his fighters. The Russians and Iranians stepped in and saved the regime. If the Gulf States had continued supporting the zealots unhindered, Syria would have fallen to Daesh - do you really want to have an entire country under Daesh?

    The Iranians despite being under sanctions still managed to push back Daesh. Qatar was left on their own as the Saudis decided to drop Daesh once Obama was out. Turkey who provided the border crossings also felt threatened by the hand the Kurds were playing and also abandoned Daesh.

    Until today there have not been any Shia outreach into madrasahs or religious teachers in mosques but the conservative notions have consistently been attributed to Wahhabism/Salafism. Just look around you in Singapore. How many radical Shias have been picked up under ISA?

    Again I have tried to inject as wide a scope to the recent developments in an area that is very complexed.

    I am not oblivious to how foreign policy and state interests actually dictate these matters. The hypocrisy is clear - the Saudis keep banging on about how Persians should not interfere in Arab matters but say nothing when the Americans decide to station more troops in Syria, still a sovereign country, uninvited under the guise of ensuring the defeat of Daesh but in reality backing a rogue bunch of anti-Assad forces in order to set up so-called governance structures? The same forces who have the best military tech were unable to take out jihadist in Toyota trucks and now after the hard lifting by the Russians and Iranians decide they should be on the ground? Ludicrous enough?

    But the view that the Iranians are solely responsible for destabilising the region overlooks just how much of a role the Sunni Gulf States played in funding the barbarity unleashed in Syria and Iraq against other Arabs who were also Sunni under the guise of promoting the democratic will of the people who were forced into exile and then became fodder for the refugee crisis.
     
    Last edited: Dec 7, 2017
  16. scroobal

    scroobal Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jul 16, 2008
    Messages:
    24,949
    Likes Received:
    194
    Trophy Points:
    63
    Agree with the comment below wholeheartedly.

     
  17. scroobal

    scroobal Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jul 16, 2008
    Messages:
    24,949
    Likes Received:
    194
    Trophy Points:
    63
    Thanks, the input from all angles is deeply appreciated. I see aggregation here that I could never get elsewhere. Real bounty!

     
  18. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
    I've left out the most obvious example of Yemen as another extension of Gulf tinkering with the lives of other Arab Sunnis but that conclusion is the same.

    Anyway, here's Al Qaeda in Yemen's press release - in summary:
    AQAP in Yemen claims Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel proves that the U.S. is subservient to Zionists. The statement also told Muslims they now have an obligation to provide funds and weapons to mujahdeen in Palestine to defend holy territory.

    Screen Shot 2017-12-08 at 12.01.24 AM.png
     
  19. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38
  20. gatehousethetinkertailor

    gatehousethetinkertailor Alfrescian Old Timer

    Joined:
    Jan 6, 2012
    Messages:
    1,236
    Likes Received:
    21
    Trophy Points:
    38

Share This Page